This paper argues that feeling compassion (and other relational emotions)
richly), one must take care to exercise the 'multi-perspectival imagination' in legal reasoning -which means exercising compassion for a wide range of participants whose perspectives matter for the case at hand.
The three parts of the paper below broadly follow the above-mentioned steps of the argument. First, I articulate what I mean by cognitively-evaluative relational feelings, distinguishing them from the processes of empathy and sympathy. In this part, I also outline the process of compassion. Second, I define what I mean by the perspectival and multi-perspectival imagination, and look at the relations between emotion and imagination. And, third, I illustrate the potential for this compassionenabled multi-perspectival imagination in adjudication by reference to the DeShaney case (1989).
II. Cognitively-evaluative relational feelings: situating compassion
In this first part of the paper I situate my understanding of the process of compassion in three ways: first, I relate it to but also distinguish it from empathy and sympathy; second, I explain what I mean by classifying compassion as a cognitively-evaluative relational feeling; and third, I provide an outline of the process of compassion.
Empathy, sympathy, compassion
In order to better situate what I mean by compassion, I propose in this section to compare and contrast it to empathy and sympathy. I acknowledge the large literatures on all these terms -for present purposes, what is important is to offer stipulative definitions of them that will allow me to carve out what I take to be distinctive about compassion.
By empathy, then, I propose to mean the ability and process of understanding what another person might be experiencing and the situation in which they are experiencing it. Defined this way, empathy is cognitive -crucially, it need not involve experiencing any emotion, of actual feeling. Of course, the (initial and continual) development of empathy as an ability surely requires the experience of emotion, but it is not necessarily the case that any one exercise of empathy is (on this definition) an affective state or process. Further, empathy does not necessarily involve -as I argue, below, sympathy does -evaluation. It is, rather, the bare process of understandingmaking inferences -as to what another person may be experiencing.
Sympathy is related to empathy, but in the sense I use it here, goes one step further, that is having attempted (as in empathy) some understanding of the situation of the other and their experience of it, sympathy involves an evaluation of that experience. Sympathy, then, is cognitively-evaluative (empathy being only cognitive).
This sense of sympathy is arguably close to the way Adam Smith uses the concept in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (2002 Sentiments ( [1759 ), where the impartial spectator approves or disapproves of the emotions of the person being observed -asking, for instance, 'would I, as an impartial spectator, also feel or have felt resentment in this situation?', with consequences for one's moral judgement. Evaluation here clearly depends on cognition -one must first be capable of understanding the situation of the other person before one can evaluate how they experience it. Crucially, as with empathy, we can exercise sympathy without feeling any emotion (though, again, our ability to sympathise develops as a result of emotional experiences and reflections on themas indeed Smith is at pains to show). Thus, both empathy and sympathy are cognitive processes, with sympathy also being evaluative, and neither necessarily involve feeling any emotion.
We come, finally, to compassion. I acknowledge that compassion is necessarily cognitive (like empathy) and evaluative (like sympathy). With respect to the evaluative dimension, however, one has to be careful: I will be suggesting that compassion is necessarily thinly evaluative, meaning that the other person is salient to us and that we have some concern for them. This thin evaluation is necessary, but thick evaluation is only contingent. By thick evaluation I mean approving or disapproving of their feelings, for example whether they are proportionate or deserving. But despite the overlap with empathy and sympathy in these ways, compassion is also different from them both in that it necessarily involves feeling. In short, the crucial point is that there is something it feels like to experience compassion -whereas this is not necessarily so for empathy and sympathy.
It is notoriously difficult to articulate what is meant by 'feeling'. I also acknowledge the debate in the literature on emotions as to whether emotions require feelings. Later, when I speak of the process of compassion, I refer to feeling some of the suffering one takes another to be in, and then feeling sadness for that suffering.
These states may be experienced in different ways, but it seems to me arguable that they include: (a) some bodily changes (which are likely to differ across people), for instance a certain heaviness in one's stomach when feeling some of the suffering one takes another to be in; and (b) a more immediate focus or concentration upon the object of one's emotion, which may include a greater readiness or willingness to perform some action with respect to that object. It is important for my argument that this action may refer to imagination -to (as I will articulate it later) the mental activity of constructing images of possibilities and alternatives -for I shall be arguing that by feeling, we imagine more richly. Compassion, then, includes experiencing these states, and in this respect, compassion is unlike empathy and sympathy. The latter are more distant from the object and one's actions, less focused, less self-involving -and, again, crucially for my argument, less likely to stimulate the imagination.
Cognitively-evaluative relational feelings
Emotions, for present purposes, are then cognitively-evaluative feelings. By thinking of emotions in this way, I express solidarity with those theories that treat emotions as intelligent, as 'concerned with receiving and processing information' (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 23) , and to some extent as judgements or appraisals of value. Compassion is an emotion -and it is thus also a cognitively-evaluative feeling. However, it is a particular kind of emotion. To help see this, let me draw an analytical map of some of the different dimensions of emotions.
For a start, emotions can have three objects. Our emotions can be: (1) worlddirected (as when we fear something in the environment, for example a tidal wave, a storm etc.); (2) self-directed (as when, for instance, we experience self-pity, or are scared of ourselves); 1 and other-directed emotions (what I call 'relational emotions', of which compassion is one). The point of making such distinctions is that there may well be different cognitive and evaluative abilities that are exercised, or exercised in different ways, depending on the objects our emotions are directed to.
Relational (that is, other-directed) emotions can be further broken down in various ways. First, one can distinguish between three different modes of interaction:
first, one can experience relational emotions in a directly interactive (secondpersonal) way, for example in face-to-face interaction; second, one can experience them communally, as when, for instance, one feels safety in numbers; 2 and third, one can experience them spectatorially. Once again, there may be different abilities at stake in these different modes -for example, one must surely be quicker, make faster guesses, more fragile and tentative inferences, in a direct interactive encounter than one can (usually) afford in the spectatorial mode. The spectatorial mode itself, however, can also be further broken down: arguably, it makes a difference whether one is actually observing someone and their situation (for instance, witnessing an accident on the street) -the 'observational' sub-mode -or reading a report / description of it (as in a novel, or a witness statement) -the 'testimonial' sub-mode.
For the purposes of this paper, I am interested in the spectatorial mode of relational emotions, and especially those in the testimonial sub-mode, namely those that are experienced in the course of reading a report or hearing a description of someone else's experience. Thus, I acknowledge that compassion can be experienced in various modes of interaction, but I focus here on it as experienced in the spectatorial (testimonial) mode.
Further, one can also break down relational emotions into non-mediated and mediated ones. Thus, one can speak of the emotions we experience vis-à-vis others in a way that is not mediated by another emotion, for example one can feel envious of another. But one can also experience a relational emotion that is first mediated by another one -for instance, in compassion one arguably needs to experience some of the suffering 3 one takes (knows or infers) the other to be in, before one feels sadness for them. One can think of other examples too: schadenfreude or emotions closely related to compassion (such as pity). For the purposes of this paper, I am interested in the mediated relational emotions.
In sum, then, for the purposes of this paper, I focus on compassion as a mediated cognitively-evaluative relational feeling, experienced in the spectatorial (testimonial) mode. it to be key to the process of compassion that one actually feels some of the suffering that one has taken or imagined the other to be in.
The process of compassion
4. Having felt something of the suffering one imagines or takes the other person to experience, one is then likely to return to imagining the situation of the other and their perspective on it. Indeed, there is likely to be a multiple backand-forth between feeling some of what one takes to be the suffering of the other and imagining (increasingly more richly) their situation and perspective.
The two processes are naturally difficult to disentangle (I am disentangling them somewhat artificially for analytical purposes). As I will go on elaborate, feeling some of the suffering one takes the other to be in stimulates one to imagine the situation from their perspective more richly, and imagining it more richly, may well stimulate one to feel more of the suffering one imagines them to be in.
5. Finally, having both imagined and felt some of the suffering of the other person, one then feels sadness for their suffering. 4 This is also a crucial step, without which there is no compassion. One has to be capable of stepping outside the perspective of the other, and experience the feeling (that one has oneself, as oneself) for another's suffering. The feeling of sadness for another's suffering may also result in one returning to imagine the situation and perspective of another more richly, and to better understand the suffering they may be in, thereby also intensifying the feeling of sadness for another.
These are the minimal bones of what is a multi-layered, multi-stage, and also backand-forth, dynamic process of the emotion of compassion.
To this basic structure, one may add several extra elements. Space will not permit me to discuss these in detail, so let me simply flag two of them. For some, most notably Nussbaum (2001, pp. 311-315) , there is necessarily a stronger evaluative element in compassion, namely the evaluation of the other's suffering as undeserved.
I suggest that it is possible for me to experience sadness for the suffering I take another to be in without having evaluated them as undeserving. Yet more strongly, though also more rarely, it is also possible to experience that sadness even after having evaluated someone as deserving of suffering. I acknowledge that this requires effort and may be a question of skill -one may need to train oneself to be able to experience sadness for the suffering of those who one either does not evaluate as undeserving of it, or that one does evaluate the other as deserving of that suffering.
Indeed, this may be a crucial skill (let us call it the skill of overcoming strongly evaluative compassionate resistance) in many circumstances in which one is given the task of evaluating the conduct of a wide variety of persons (as judges in legal institutions are). For these reasons, I would consider this stronger evaluative element a contingent one. I would also regard as contingent Nussbaum's other condition, namely that the suffering for the other be serious rather than trivial (see Nussbaum, 2001, pp. 306-311) . Treating the other's suffering as serious may be part of some experiences of compassion, but I also think it is possible to experience compassion for what may initially strike one as trivial, but which one comes to revise (precisely as a result of the process of compassion) as serious for that particular person.
III. Compassion and the (multi-) perspectival imagination
In the above outline of the process of compassion, imagination played a key role. In this part of the paper, I want to zero in on this relationship between compassion and the imagination. I do so in two steps: first, discussing the sense in which the imagination can be perspectival and multi-perspectival; and second, turning to the relationship between emotion and imagination. I do so with a view to indicating, later, the importance of imagining (richly, as a result of feeling compassion for) the perspectives of (multiple) others in the process of legal reasoning.
The perspectival and multi-perspectival imagination
The perspectival and multi-perspectival imagination is a sub-set of imagination in general. The philosophical debate over the bounds of the imagination has intensified in the past few decades, and it has become common to speak of the variety of exercises of the imagination, all needing to be carefully distinguished. imagery, but this is often a matter of definition (e.g. if one includes supposing or conceiving in one's definition, then one will think it is possible to imagine without imagery). 8 Moran says that in the case of dramatic imagination, 'more is revealed and given of oneself than in the case of ordinary counterfactual reasoning ' (1994, p. 105 …if we wish to learn something about the inner 'world' of another individualthat aspect of her perspective which is not held in common with the rest of humanity -we can do so only by studying the combinations that she typically (and unconsciously) produces among the elements of any given domain. (2004, p. 60) In the case of Marcel's perspective -Marcel being the character that Proust explores in his great novel -we must therefore pay attention to the associations and connections that inform his own construction of the situation. Perspective is an active, affectively-rich, meaning-constructing process. It takes time and effort to learn anything -even a small fraction -of someone else's perspective (for Proust, a master, it takes many years and over four thousand pages). We learn something about
Marcel's experience of the steeples from the following quotes (in a piece of writing by
Marcel that we are made privy to by Proust):
10 I leave for another occasion the very interesting idea that in the other-oriented kind of imagining others, the self may still be necessarily involved in some way.
The minutes passed, we were travelling fast, and yet the three steeples were still a long way ahead of us, like three birds perched upon the plain, motionless and conspicuous in the sunlight… …a little later, when we were already close to Combray, the sun having set meanwhile, I caught sight of them for the last time, far away, and seeming no more now than three flowers painted upon the sky above the low line of the fields. They made me think, too, of three maidens in a legend, abandoned in a solitary place over which night had begun to fall. The idea is that different perspectives reveal different aspects of things, and that the pursuit of objectivity is just the attempt to broaden one's perspectives by using others to take account of aspects of the world obscured by one's own… the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our 'concept' of the thing, our 'objectivity', be. b) recognising that this process is a difficult one, which requires training and development; and c) exercising humility, in particular by recognising the necessary incompleteness of any one attempt to imagine the perspective of another.
Emotion and imagination
Having articulated what I mean by relational emotions and the perspectival and multiperspectival imagination, it is now time to turn to the relationship between them -a relationship that, as I will indicate in the final part of the paper, is important for the quality of legal reasoning. In doing so, I will be drawing mainly on Adam Morton's it is typically accompanied by emotion -and, again, sometimes by a great deal of emotion -such that typically there is something it feels like to imagine how someone else might be experiencing a certain situation.
Further, and this is also critical for present purposes, Morton notices that in many cases emotion (and here I would include compassion) increases the richness and vivacity of imagining, which might further increase the intensity of the experience of an emotion. The relationship, then, is not only one of overlap at the same time, but also mutual stimulation over time. Here is one example he gives:
…think of someone watching a skier approach an icy downhill run. She thinks of the run as very dangerous today, and wonders if the ski patrol are on duty.
She is not worried about that skier so much as generally apprehensive about current conditions. Then she recognises the skier as her child, and suddenly she visualises all the bends on the run where one might fall, the trees one might run into, the moguls in surprising places, and has an impulse to rush down the run herself to give first aid, or take another route and alert the patrol… She even has a stray thought of wolves in the woods preying on fallen skiers, and then a fantasy of her own car breaking down in a snowstorm so that she freezes before she is found. (2013, p. 32) The observer here first begins to imagine more richly on the back of an increase in feeling (of greater concern, having recognised the skier as her own child). Imagining more richly, in turn, intensifies her emotion (of concern for, fear of, her child), and this intensification of emotion further spurs her imagination, not only more richly, but even quite extravagantly (for example, imagining wolves). We can also surely relate to Morton's example, of course, also illustrates various dangers -the imagination, stimulated by emotion, can construct wildly implausible possibilities;
and, the fact that we imagine more richly may be caused by bias, that is by who or what we are already predisposed to care about. These dangers are real, but I do not think they warrant the conclusion that we should thus dismiss the value of feeling imaginatively or imagining by feeling -that would be to give up on the considerable insights that engaging in such imaginative acts can provide (precisely into the perspectives of others). Thus, to the contrary, I would argue (along with Nietzsche)
that we should instead (at least in contexts of judgement) exercise the multiperspectival imagination. Aiming to understand better a certain situation, we do not withdraw into allegedly non-perspectival abstractions, but instead enter into multiple concrete perspectives -and, in order to increase the quality of our imagining those perspectives, we do so with feeling. It is, to repeat, only by feeling that we can get closer to (by imagining, of course always imperfectly) the concrete and particular experiences of someone else's perspective.
There is one final and important aspect to this affective dimension of imagination that I wish to mention, before going on in the next part to briefly illustrate the argument in the adjudicative context. That is the role of emotion in what is referred to as 'imaginative resistance'. As Balcerak explains it, 'imaginative resistance occurs when a subject is asked to imagine a particular situation, but is either unable or unwilling to do so ' (2016, p. 47) . She goes on to claim that 'most convincing examples' of it 'involve requests to imagine situations where morally highly deviant behaviour and attitudes are endorsed', for example confronted with the case of Alice, who 'took her new-born baby, put it into a cotton bag, closed the bag tightly with a rope, and threw it into the lake', there may be resistance to imagining the scene, let alone Alice's perspective (2016, p. 47) . What Balcerak does not address here is the role of emotion -and yet, that role must be considerable. Faced with such an example there may be not only resistance to imagining -but also anger (moral anger, or even outrage) against Alice, as well as stomach-churning sickness to imagining the scene (which leads to further resistance). Thus, just as imagining more richly is tied to emotion (in the ways I have discussed above), so is refusing to imagine or resisting imagining. Such resistances may be tolerable if reading a novel or watching a play or film -but they are different if the reader is tasked with evaluating Alice. What one needs to develop, then, is an ability to deliberately feel -in this case, some of Alice's suffering, and then sadness for her -in order to not only better imagine her perspective, but also to challenge (and move somewhat beyond) resistance to imagining it. This is necessary if Alice is to be given the respect she deserves, not as someone who has murdered their baby, but as a subject of others' judgement.
IV. The adjudicative context
In this third, and final, part of the paper, I wish to point -and I can only point, in a sketchy way -to how we might see the above account of compassion -as a cognitively-evaluative relational emotion linked closely to the perspectival imagination -in the context of exercising legal judgement. I do so by reference to the now (in)famous case in the law and compassion literature, namely the DeShaney case (1989).
My argument, in general, is that actually feeling compassion will improve the quality of legal judgement. This is because the quality of a legal judgement depends in part on how well the multi-perspectival imagination is exercised by the judges, and that exercise, in turn, depends on actually feeling compassion -especially in cases (which are likely to be common) where judges might otherwise resist imagining. I have already argued for a conception of compassion as a complex, multi-layered, multistage process, which involves (again, as I have developed it above) the perspectival imagination. Compassion -to reiterate the point once more -stimulates the perspectival imagination. 14 What now needs to be developed is the connection between the use of the multi-perspectival imagination and the quality of a legal judgement.
There are three principal reasons why the multi-perspectival imagination is so important for the quality of a judgement: 15 first, it assists judges in better applying legal concepts -which I would extend to those beyond constitutional / human rights, to all kinds of legal concepts (for example, economic duress, or offer and acceptance);
second, by describing the perspectives of various stakeholders in the dispute, judges in the present case provide better resources for future courts; and third, it shows greater respect to parties coming before one and seeking a hearing. For reasons of space, I discuss only the first two in the next section. The first two are best discussed in the context of a particular case, and the third will be returned to in the final section below.
16
The skeleton facts 17 of the US constitutional case of DeShaney are well known: a child, Joshua, was subjected to multiple beatings by his father. After receiving complaints, a county department of social services took various steps to protect Joshua (including briefly taking Joshua into care, and away from the father, only to hand him back, though under the regime of regular visits by a social worker).
Eventually, the father beat the boy so badly that he suffered permanent brain damage.
A suit was filed, by the representatives of the child, against the county on the basis Zipursky's classic paper (1990). In both cases, there is an emphasis on the cognitive, but not on the affective dimension of emotion. 15 There may be other ways in which one could articulate / taxonomise the importance of the multi-perspectival imagination for legal reasoning, e.g. one could point to its significance for 1) the quality of deliberation (recalling the difficulty of imagining, and also the benefits of perspective-switching, one could argue that this slows down our deliberation, helping us to distance ourselves from impulsive reactions to facts, and thus our biases, generating time and space for more careful reflection); 2) the quality of the justification (thus the quality of the reasons, and their ability to balance more of the relevant interests, needs and values at stake); and 3) the quality of description (i.e. of the facts, and especially the role of certain persons). 16 The argument, in brief, would be that if one understands the rule of law -as Neil MacCormick did (2005) -as, in part, enabling a public space in which one can be heard, and if feeling compassion helps improve one's ability to imagine the perspectives of others, then compassion is not a threat, but rather a condition of impartiality and the rule of law. 17 In referring to them as 'skeleton' I by no means wish to suggest that the particular description that follows is in any way basic or neutral -like any description of any facts, it is necessarily narratologically and affectively charged. ' (1990, p. 1135) and 'inferior treatment ' (1990, p. 1137 to a concern that if the argument of the petitioners was upheld, the effect on state departments might be that they would not be able to undertake child protection services at all. One can, surely, imagine -more or less richly -not only the immediate impact on the institution (those who work there and may lose their jobs), but also those to be affected by the institution not being able to offer such services (other children and families). In that sense, then, one can imagine the perspective of the institution, and if one can do that, then arguably one could also feel compassion for all those persons affected by what the institution does (or may not do in the future). The point here is that it improves the quality of legal reasoning to consider, in some richness, the needs, values and interests at stake from the perspective of the institution.
Taking into account these perspectives -imagining them, in their concreteness and particularity -is not just a matter of improving the quality of the application of relevant concepts in the instant case. It is also a matter of providing better resources for future courts. The description of facts -often multiple descriptions in multimember benches -is one of the key features of the resourcefulness of the common law. It is certainly something that complexifies the task of judges and in general makes the system less efficient in the long-term. resources, for it gives future courts access to a highly contextualised set of normative judgements, in which there is room for exploring differences and similarities between fact patterns. There is no doubt that recommending to judges that they exercise the multi-perspectival imagination, in a way that is accompanied (because it is so effectively stimulated) by compassion, would complexify the task still further. There will be a limit, clearly, to how much of such imagining -and the correlate describingjudges will be able to engage in. But it is vitally important that they do -not only because it gives them insight into the needs, interests and values at stake in the decisions they are making, but also because it allows them to communicate this to future courts.
The resourcefulness of the common law is its anchor to particular facts -and not abstract statements of principle -for it is that which allows future courts to take more measured, careful, nuanced decisions. The richer description of particular facts that results from the exercise of the multi-perspectival imagination enables that further -and this is especially important in cases where there are needs, interests and values that can easily be missed or neglected as a result of a tendency to resist imagining certain perspectives.
V. Conclusion
Compassion stands out as one of the most important emotions for the adjudicative context. It does so as one of the paradigmatic relational (that is, other-directed) emotions. It also does so because it is often associated with mindless bias -something that, if experienced, is sometimes thought to be more likely to lower the quality of legal reasoning, and endanger impartiality and ultimately the rule of law. My aim in this paper has been to defend the case for compassion in legal reasoning, and to do so via its role in helping us to imagine the perspectives of others more richly, including helping us to overcome instances of resistance to imagining certain perspectives. The process of compassion may be the best instrument judges have to hear and show respect to the perspectives of persons who come before them. Further, it may be the
